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SOME ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF GRAIN RESERVES
The ownership and management of
grain reserves will be decided by poli
ticians who are in turn influenced by
evidence that various interest groups
present to them. Currently, the evi
dence has focused on economic impli
cations. One of the implications is
the costs of storing and caring for the
grain reserve. These costs include
shrinkage, insurance, interest, taxes,
fixed and variable costs for storage
facilities, and the risk of price de
clines. Whoever owns and manages the
reserves must receive or will most
likely demand compensation for these
costs.
The potential economic effect of a
reserve on grain prices is another im
portant factor. If the grain can be
isolated from the normal market system
by legislation or some other mechanism,
then its effect on grain prices may be
minimized. If, however, the reserve
is only partially isolated from the
normal market then its effect on grain
prices could be substantial.
Past grain surpluses, for example,
were not isolated from the market and
as a result prices for grain were de
pressed. Numerous federal government
programs were started to compensate for
these low prices. Programs included
price supports, commodity credit stor
age, low-rate interest loans for
building storage, and government pay
ments or subsidies to farmers. These
program costs were born by tax payers
most of whom were also consumers.
Thus, while consumers were not paying
the price at the grocery store, they
were paying it through taxes.
Another economic concern is who
should own and manage the grain re
serves. Various interest groups, indi
viduals and others have advanced evi
dence supporting different view points
on this issue. Currently, alternative
solutions being offered for ownership
and management of the reserves include
producers, users, or government.
Producer Ownership and Management
One factor favoring producer owner
ship and management of grain reserves is
substantial on-farm and local elevator
storage available in most states. Ini
tially, a grain reserve at this level
would place the price risks and costs of
storing grain with the producer. Pro
ducers would have the advantage of more
readily participating in any gain in
market prices and could also obtain
Commodity Credit Corporation loans on
reserve stocks of grain. If the market
did not provide compensation to cover
the risks and costs, however, producers
might be unwilling to accept the grain
reserve task unless a government program
to finance such storage was developed.
Critics of producer ownership and
management have claimed that market prices
would not stabilize and reserves would not
be available in large enough quantities
to satisfy contingency demands that
might arise. To support their claims,
opponents argue as follows: 1) that
when grain prices are rising, growers
tend to hold stocks off the market and
wait for even higher prices; 2) farm-
stored stocks require too many indivi
dual decisions to sell and to ship to
be effective in meeting demands.
User Ownership and Management
Grain users, acting collectively
and with the addition of more storage
capacity, could own and manage contin
gency stocks of grain. This would in
sure users of an available supply in
case of shortages and would concentrate
the holding of reserves into large
enough quantities that availability
would not be a problem.
Critics of user ownership and
management advance three main arguments:
1. With inflation and high interest
rates the costs of holding in
ventories would be substantial;
therefore, many users may not
be able to hold reserves.
2. More concentrated holding of
grain and collective action on
the part of users could provide
the basis for manipulation of
prices rather than price sta
bility.
3. The risks associated with a
price drop could be negated to
some extent by the use of fu
tures contracts; however, this
does not assure that grain sup
plies would be available. It
might again be necessary to
develop a government program to
compensate users for the risks
and costs associated with grain
reserves.
Government Ownership and Management
Supporters of this alternative
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state that indirectly the whole consuming
public benefits because adequate grain
reserves result in stable and lower price
levels for grain. They acknowledge, how
ever, that past programs for surplus
grain stocks have been costly and have
entailed other problems of social and
political concern.
Opponents of this alternative have
stated that grain reserves owned and
managed by the government unduly depress
farm prices and are subject to political
bargaining and influencing by vested in
terest groups. Additionally, critics
have charged that past government programs
have mi sal located resources and provided
for "giveaway" foreign aid.
Summary
This discussion has identified some
of the economic implications of grain
reserves. For convenience, alternative
solutions were categorized and presented
separately. It is likely, however, that
future grain reserve policies will en
compass some combination of these alter
natives. Increased interest and input
by all affected parties would help in
form politicians of the consequences and
importance of grain reserve policies
that would be grossly unfair, unworkable,
or result in inefficient grain reserve
programs.
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